Multidimensional screening, affliation, and full

separation by Szalay, Dezsö & Blackorby, Charles
 
 
 
Multidimensional Screening, Affiliation, and Full Separation 
 
Charles Blackorby and Dezsö Szalay  
 
No 802 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
WARWICK ECONOMIC RESEARCH PAPERS 
 
 
 
 
DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS 
Multidimensional Screening, A¢ liation, and Full
Separation
Charles Blackorby and Dezsö Szalay
The University of Warwick
June 6, 2007
Abstract
We solve a class of two-dimensional screening problems in which one
dimension has the standard features, while the other dimension is impos-
sible to exaggerate and enters the agents utility only through the message
but not the true type. Natural applications are procurement and regu-
lation where the producers ability to produce quality and his costs of
producing quantity are both unknown; or selling to a budget constrained
buyer. We show that under these assumptions, the orthogonal incen-
tive constraints are necessary and su¢ cient for the full set of incentive
constraints. Provided that types are a¢ liated and all the conditional dis-
tributions of types have monotonic inverse hazard rates, the solution is
fully separating in both dimensions.
1 Introduction
The optimal screening of agents has had many fruitful applications including
optimal taxation, non linear pricing, public utility regulation and procurement
policies. For the most part these studies only consider cases where the agents
di¤er in one unknown characteristic. This restriction is primarily for technical
and not for economic reasons.
Formal analysis of multidimensional screening problems is substantially dif-
ferent from the analysis of one-dimensional problems in part because bunch-
We thank Paul Beaudry and Benny Moldovanu for helpful conversations. Correspon-
dence can be sent to the authors at the Economics Department, University of Warwick, Gib-
bet Hill Road, Coventry CV4 7AL, United Kingdom, or to c.blackorby@warwick.ac.uk and
dezso.szalay@warwick.ac.uk.
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ing is a common feature of the optimal solution.1 Because of these technical
di¢ culties, most of the research using models of adverse selection are one di-
mensional. There are exceptions. Explicit solution have been found for some
multi-dimensional problems; for example, La¤ont, Maskin, and Rochet [1987],
Lewis and Sappington [1988], McAfee and MacMillan [1988], Matthews and
Moore [1987], and Jehiel et al [1999]. In addition there are two useful surveys
of these multidimensional problems Armstrong and Rochet [1999] and Ro-
chet and Stole [2003]. The latter propose two di¤erent procedures for reducing
the dimensionality of a problem aggregation and separability. The aggrega-
tion procedure consists of nding an aggregator for the unknown characteristics
which may of course depend on other parameters of the problem. They refer to
separability for the case when the solution to the problem depends upon a par-
ticular distribution of types such as in Wilson [1993] and Armstrong [1996]. In
this note we propose an alternative, but not unrelated, procedure for reducing
the dimensionality of such a problem. We present two assumptions that may
hold in many types of models and that imply that the optimum can be found
by analyzing a series of one-dimensional problems.
More specically, we assume that one of the unobserved characteristics is
such that individuals can only imitate in one direction and that the two un-
known characteristics are a¢ liated.2 When these two conditions are met, we
show that solution to each of the one-dimensional problems, conditional on the
values taken by the characteristic that has an upper bound for each individual,
actually yields the solution for the overall problem provided that the two types
are a¢ liated.3 In particular we show that that the large number of incentive
compatibility constraints in this two-dimensional problem can be reduced to two
one-dimensional incentive compatibility conditions one in each direction.
In Section 2 we present a simple principal-agent procurement model in some
detail. The principal desires a variable quantity of a good of unknown quality.
The agents supply a quantity of the good of a certain quality with unknown
costs. It is assumed that each agent can produce a maximum quality and can
only imitate lower qualities. The principal is assumed to want each agent to
1Bunching refers to the fact that di¤erent types may be treated identically in the optimum.
The most general results to date have been obtained by Armstrong [1996] and Rochet and
Chone [1998].
2Two random variables with density f(; ) are a¢ liated if for   0 and   0
f (; ) f
 
0; 0
  f  0;  f  ; 0
3To the best of our knowledge, this was rst proposed and used by Beaudry, Blackorby,
and Szalay [2006] to solve an optimal income tax problem.
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produce the highest quality possible. In this setting we show that the solution
to the one-dimensional unknown cost problem conditional on the quality
is, in fact, the solution to the two-dimensional problem provided that the two
unknown characteristics are a¢ liated.
In Section 3 we set up a reasonably standard regulation problem as in Baron
and Myerson [1982], Lewis and Sappington [1988], and Armstrong [1999] allow-
ing for two dimensions of asymmetric information. The regulator maximises
a weighted sum of consumersplus producerssurplus where again the quality
and the costs are unknown. Given some restrictions on the surplus functions
we show that the solutions to all the one dimensional problems conditional on
quality remain the solutions to the overall problem provided that the unknown
characteristics are a¢ liated.
In Section 4 we take the model of Che and Gale [2000]4 of selling to an
budget-constrained buyer. The buyer has private information about his valua-
tion of the good and about how much money he can spend on this good. Thus
the selling procedure may be altered because the buyer cannot spend more
money than he has. Che and Gale solve this problem for two cases, when the
buyer must post a bond and is therefore unable to mimic more wealthy types,
and when the buyer does not have to post a bond. We show that the rst case
is amenable to the technique proposed in Section 2 and solve this problem by
assuming that the valuation of the commodity and the negative of the wealth
are a¢ liated.
2 The procurement model
A principal wishes to contract with an agent to buy a good where x is the
quantity of the good the principal obtains, q is the quality of the good, and t is
the transfer payment to the agent. . The net utility to the principal is
V (x; q)  t:
The agents utility from delivering the good in quantity x and quality q is
t  C (x; q; ; )
where  and  are parameters that shift the agents cost of production. More
specically, we assume that  denes the upper bound on the quality q the agent
4See also Che and Gale [1998].
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is capable of producing, in the sense that
C (x; q; ; ) =
(
C (x; q; ) for q  
1 for q > :
C (x; q; ) is the cost function on the relevant range of qualities.
We assume that V (x; q) satises V (0; q) = 0 for all q; Vx (x; q) > 0 and
Vxx (x; q) < 0 for all x and q; limx!0 Vx (x; q) = 1 for all q; and Vq (x; q) > 0
for all x > 0. C (x; q; ) satises C (0; q; ) = 0 for all q; ; Cx (x; q; ) > 0;
C (x; q; ) > 0; and Cq (x; q; )  0 for x; q;  such that x > 0; and Cx (x; q; ) >
0 and Cxx (x; q; )  0 for all x; q; .
These conditions are standard except perhaps for the one which implies that
the principal has a taste for higher quality commodities. In addition we need
one assumption that is imposed jointly on the value function of the principal
and the cost function of the agent: V and C satisfy Vxq (x; q)  Cxq (x; q; ). As
will be seen in Proposition 1, this guarantees that when there is full information
the principal wants to buy the highest quality that is available from the agent.
While the agent knows the parameters ; and ; the principal knows only
their joint distribution. ;  are distributed on a rectangle

; 
 ;  where
;  > 0: We denote f (; ) the joint density of the distribution and assume it
has full support, so that the conditional densities of  conditional on , f ( j ) ;
have full support as well. The parameters  and  are not observable, either ex
ante or ex post. The quality of the good, q; and the quantity of the good, x are
observable through the utility the principal derives from consuming the good,
V (x; q) :
Before we analyze the contacting problem in detail, we discuss the bench-
mark case where the principal has complete information.
2.1 The Full Information Benchmark
The principals problem is to choose schedules x (; ) ; t (; ) and q (; ) such
that q (; )   to maximize her surplus subject to the constraint that the
agent is willing to participate. Clearly, the agents participation constraint,
t (; )  C (x (; ) ; q (; ) ; )  0;
must be binding for each type, because the principals net utility is decreasing in
t: Imposing this condition, we can write the principals problem under complete
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information as follows:
max
x(;);q(;)
Z

Z

(V (x (; ) ; q (; ))  C (x (; ) ; q (; ) ; )) f (; ) dd
subject to q (; )  :
Given our assumptions, the integrand is concave in x; so the optimal quantity
schedule, x (; ) ; must satisfy the condition
Vx (x
 (; ) ; q (; )) = Cx (x (; ) ; q (; ) ; )
The optimal quality choice must satisfy either
Vq (x
 (; ) ; q (; )) = Cq (x (; ) ; q (; ) ; )
or
q (; ) =  and Vq (x (; ) ; )  Cq (x (; ) ; ; )  0
In the former case the problem admits an interior solution, whereas, in the
latter case it is optimal to produce the highest quality level. We focus on
the second option because the parameter  a¤ects the solution only when the
constraint is binding. When the constraint is not binding this becomes a one-
dimenional problem for which methods of solution are well known. There are
simple su¢ cient conditions that ensure that the solution for q is indeed on
the boundry. When the agents cost is independent of q; then the solution is
clearly to produce the highest quality, since the principal benets from higher
quality. Since this case is somewhat trivial, we focus on another set of su¢ cient
conditions.
Proposition 1 Given our regularity conditions, including the assummption that
Vxq (x; q)  Cxq (x; q; ),
q (; ) =  for all ; 
Proof. Observe that
Vq (x; q) Cq (x; q; ) =
xZ
0
(Vq (; q)  Cq (; q; )) d + (Vq (0; q)  Cq (0; q; ))
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Using V (0; q) = C (0; q; ) = 0 for all q; , we have
Vq (0; q) = Cq (0; q; ) = 0 for all q; :
Thus, we can write
Vq (x; q)  Cq (x; q; ) =
xZ
0
(Vq (; q)  Cq (; q; )) d:
By assumption the integrand is non-negative pointwise, which establishes the
claim.
Higher quality is always desirable because the marginal utility of consuming
x increases faster (or at the same speed) in q than does the marginal cost
of production. Hence, with the full information the principal always chooses
the maximum quality the agent can produce. We now address the principals
problem when  and  are not observable to him.
2.2 The Principals Contracting Problem
We analyze the principals problem as a message game, where the agent is asked
to announce a type

^; ^

and is given incentives to do so truthfully. Formally,
the principal solves the problem
max
x(;);t(;);q(;)
Z

Z

(V (x (; ) ; q (; ))  t (; )) f (; ) dd (1)
subject to, for all ;  :
t (; )  C (x (; ) ; q (; ) ; )  t

^; ^

  C

x

^; ^

; q

^; ^

; 

for all q

^; ^

 ;
(2)
t (; )  C (x (; ) ; q (; ) ; )  0; and (3)
q (; )  : (4)
While the participation constraint (3) ; and the feasibility constraint (4) are
straightforward to understand, the incentive constraint (2) deserves some expla-
nations. Since the principal cannot verify the agents true cost of production,
the agent can announce any ^: On the other hand, the principal can know the
quality level of the good the agent delivers by her consumption of it. The agent
can only send messages

^; ^

such that he is able to deliver the quality level
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specied in the contract for these messages, q

^; ^

 :
A rst step toward solving this problem is to show that at the second best
solution, the highest quality is produced for each type. This is true only under
some additional conditions. In particular, we have the following result:
Proposition 2 Suppose that the cost function can be written as
C (x; q; ) = c (x; ) + k (x; q) (5)
Then q (; ) =  for all ; :
Proof. Take any incentive compatible allocation given by the triple of sched-
ules x

^; ^

; q

^; ^

; and t

^; ^

for all ^; ^: Suppose for some ^; ^; we have
q

^; ^

< ^: Let ~ denote the set of

^; ^

such that q

^; ^

< ^: Then, we
can change the allocation to the new triple of schedules ~x

^; ^

; ~q

^; ^

; and
~t

^; ^

for all ^; ^ as follows. We set ~x

^; ^

= x

^; ^

for all ^; ^ and set
~q

^; ^

= ^ for all

^; ^

: For all

^; ^

2 ~ we adjust the transfers from the
initial transfers t

^; ^

; to the new transfers
~t

^; ^

= t

^; ^

+ C
 
x

^; ^

; ^; ^
!
  C
 
x

^; ^

; q

^; ^

; ^
!
:
We rst show that the new allocation with the new transfers is incentive com-
patible. Then, we show that the surplus to the principal has increased under
the new allocation.
Incentive compatibility of the new system is given if and only if
t (; ) + C
 
x (; ) ; ; 
!
  C
 
x (; ) ; q (; ) ; 
!
  C
 
x (; ) ; ; 
!
(6)
 t

^; ^

+ C
 
x

^; ^

; ^; ^
!
  C
 
x

^; ^

; q

^; ^

; ^
!
  C
 
x

^; ^

; ^; 
!
(7)
From incentive compatibility of x

^; ^

; q

^; ^

; and t

^; ^

for all ^; ^ we
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have
t (; )  C
 
x (; ) ; q (; ) ; 
!
 t

^; ^

  C
 
x

^; ^

; q

^; ^

; 
!
(8)
Adding and substracting C
 
x

^; ^

; q

^; ^

; 
!
on the right hand side of (6) ;
we see that, given (8) ; (6) is satised if
0  C
 
x

^; ^

; ^; ^
!
 C
 
x

^; ^

; q

^; ^

; ^
!
 
 
C
 
x

^; ^

; ^; 
!
  C
 
x

^; ^

; q

^; ^

; 
!!
:
Using C (x; q; ) = c (x; ) + k (x; q) ; we can write this as
0  k

x

^; ^

; ^

 k

x

^; ^

; q

^; ^

 

k

x

^; ^

; ^

  k

x

^; ^

; q

^; ^

= 0
so we have established incentive compatibility of ~x

^; ^

; ~q

^; ^

; and ~t

^; ^

for all ^; ^:
Consider now the surplus. The agents equilibrium payo¤s are unchanged,
as
t (; )  C (x (; ) ; q (; ) ; )
= t (; ) + C (x (; ) ; ; )  C (x (; ) ; q (; ) ; )  C (x (; ) ; ; ) :
In other words, the agent is just compensated for the increase in his cost of
production, and the entire additional surplus goes to the principal. But in this
case Proposition 1 shows that higher quality is desirable.
Additive separability of the cost function is crucial for this result. If the cost
function is not additively separable in  and q, then changing the allocation
will change the agents incentive to mimic other types. In this case a proof
as simple as ours would not establish the desirability of higher quality in the
second best; alternative assumptions and techniques of proof would be required.
Without mentioning them further, the original regularity conditions plus addi-
tive separability of the cost function in  and q are maintained throughout the
paper.
Consider next the incentive constraint (2) : The number of potential devi-
ations to consider is very large a crucial di¢ culty that problems of multidi-
mensional screening face. However, this problem has properties that permit a
substantial reduction in dimensionality.
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Proposition 3 The incentive constraints (2)are satised if and only if the con-
straints
t (; )  C (x (; ) ; ; )  t

^; 

  C

x

^; 

; ; 

for all ^ (9)
and
t (; )  C (x (; ) ; ; )  t (; ^)  C (x (; ^) ; ^; ) for all ^   (10)
are satised.
Proof. It is easy to see that the two one dimensional constraints are nec-
essary for incentive compatibility. We now show they are also su¢ cient for
incentive compatibility. If a type (; ) mimics type

^; ^

; he obtains utility
t

^; ^

 C

x

^; ^

; ^; 

: But by incentive compatibility of type (; ^) in the
 dimension, type (; ) could obtain more by mimicking type (; ^) ; since
t (; ^)  C (x (; ^) ; ^; )  t

^; ^

  C

x

^; ^

; ^; 

But then, by incentive compatibility of type (; ) in the  dimension, we have
t (; )  C (x (; ) ; ; )  t (; ^)  C (x (; ^) ; ^; ) for all ^  
showing that there cannot be a protable deviation.
The essential feature that drives this result is that the agents payo¤ only
depends on his announced ability to produce quality, ^; but not on  itself.
Therefore, if a type (; ) mimics a type (; ^) with ^  ; he obtains exactly
the same utility that type (; ^) would obtain. This is a crucial di¤erence to the
general case of multidimensional screening and greatly simplies the analysis.
Instead of solving the problem, (1) subject to (2) and (3) ; one can solve the
problem (1) subject to (3), (9) ; and (10) in which only the one dimensional
incentive constraints are relevant. However, this problem is still not easy to
solve, because there are still substantially more constraints than in the usual
one-dimensional screening problem. Our strategy to solve this problem is to
build further on the result that only one-dimensional deviations have to be
ruled out. In particular, we show that the principals problem can be solved
by screening the  types conditional on : The reason is, that under reasonable
conditions on the joint distribution of types, the constraint (10) is not binding
at the optimum. For this purpose, it is useful to rst nd a solution to the
problem when only  is unobservable and  is common knowledge.
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2.3 The Case of Observable Quality Bounds
In this case, the buyer can condition on : We let x (; ) and t (; ) for all 
denote the quantity and payment schedule conditional on : The buyer solves,
for each given , the following problem
max
x(;);t(;)
Z

(V (x (; ) ; )  t (; )) f (j ) d (11)
subject to, for all ;  :
t (; )  C (x (; ) ; ; )  t

^; 

  C

x

^; 

; ; 

for all ^ and (12)
t (; )  C (x (; ) ; ; )  0: (13)
This is a standard problem and is normally solved by reformulating the incen-
tive and participation constraints. We state a more tractable version of these
constraints in the following lemma. We call a pair of quantity schedule x (; )
and payment schedule t (; ) implementable if they satisfy constraints (12) and
(13) :
Lemma 1 The pair of quantity schedule x (; ) and payment schedule t (; )
is implementable if and only if
t (; ) = C (x (; ) ; ; ) +
Z

Cy (x (y; ) ; ; y) dy (14)
and x (; ) is non-increasing in :
Proof. Let u (; ) = max^ t

^; 

 C

x

^; 

; ; 

: Then, by the envelope
theorem,
u (; ) =  C (x (; ) ; ; )
Since u (; ) < 0; the participation constraint must be binding for type ; so
u
 
; 

= 0 Thus, we can write
u (; ) =
Z

Cy (x (y; ) ; ; y) dy
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Since u (; ) = t (; )  C (x (; ) ; ; ) ; we can write
t (; ) = C (x (; ) ; ; ) +
Z

Cy (x (y; ) ; ; y) dy:
It is then standard to show that this pair of quantity and payment schedules
satises global incentive compatibility if x (; ) is non-increasing in : This is
omitted.
Substituting the transfers into the principals objective function and inte-
grating by parts, we can write the principals problem as
max
x(;)
Z


V (x (; ) ; )  C (x (; ) ; ; )  C (x (; ) ; ; ) F (j )
f (j )

f (j ) d
subject to x (; ) being non-increasing in :
It is customary to solve this problem imposing a regularity condition on the
distribution of types that ensures that the constraint is never binding at the
solution to this problem as well as additional assumptions on the cost function.
Proposition 4 Assume that Cxx(x; ; )  0, Cx(x; ; )  0; and F ( j)f( j) is
non-decreasing in : Then, the optimal quantity schedule satises the rst-order
condition
Vx (x (; ) ; ) = Cx (x (; ) ; ; ) + Cx (x (; ) ; ; )
F (j )
f (j ) : (15)
Proof. Di¤erentiating totally, we have
dx
d
=

Cx (x (; ) ; ; ) + Cx (x (; ) ; ; )
F ( j)
f( j) + Cx (x (; ) ; ; )
@
@
F ( j)
f( j)


Vxx (x (; ) ; )  Cxx (x (; ) ; ; )  Cxx (x (; ) ; ; ) F ( j)f( j)

The denominator is a second-order condition to the principals problem, and
the assumption Cxx (x; ; )  0 ensures that it is satised. The numerator is
non-negative by our assumptions on the cost function and the monotonicity of
the inverse hazard function, thus guaranteeing that x (; ) is non decreasing in
.
Since both the procedure to solve this one-dimensional problem and the
solution that emerges from it are well known (see, e.g., Fudenberg and Tirole
(1991)) we do not dwell on the details. However, for our further results it is
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useful to review the economics behind the distortions inherent in (15) : We can
write the rst-order condition as
Vx (x (; ) ; )  Cx (x (; ) ; ; )

f (j ) = Cx (x (; ) ; ; )F (j )
On the left side we have the principals desire to implement an e¢ cient solution,
which would require that the marginal benet of consumption to the principal
is equal to the marginal cost of production to the agent. The weight given to
this motive is f (j ) ; the likelihood of type j . On the right side appears the
principals desire to limit the agents rents. An increase in x (; ) increases the
rents that have to be given to all types that are more e¢ cient at producing than
type j : Since there is a mass F (j ) of these people, the weight attached to
this motive is F (j ) :
Next, we show that, remarkably, the solution to this problem is also a solu-
tion to the overall problem, provided that the trade-o¤ between e¢ ciency and
rent extraction is a¤ected in the right wayby changes in : We address this
problem in the next subsection.
2.4 The Case of Unknown abilities and costs
We now show that, given certain restrictions on the joint distribution of char-
acteristics, the agent has no incentive to mimic another type who produces a
lower quality level. Formally, we have the following result:
Proposition 5 If, in addition to the assumptions of Proposition 4,  and  are
a¢ liated, then unobservability of  does not a¤ect the solution to the principals
problem. Formally, the solution is still given by the quantity schedule (15) and
the payment schedule (14) :
Proof. Suppose the principal o¤ers quantity schedule (15) and payment sched-
ule (14) : Thus, we identify the schedules x (; )  x (; ) and t (; )  t (; )
for all : If the agent announces his true quality ; then his indirect utility is
u (; ) =
Z

Cy (x (y; ) ; ; y) dy
If he under reports ^; then he obtains indirect utility
u (; ^) =
Z

Cy (x (y; ^) ; ^; y) dy
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So, we need to show that u (; ) is non-decreasing in : This will be the case
when the integrand is non-decreasing in  for each y and : Di¤erentiating under
the integral, we obtain
Cx (x (; ) ; ; )
dx
d
+ C (x (; ) ; ; )
From our specication of additive separability, we have C (x (; ) ; ; ) = 0:
So, we only need to show that dxd  0: Di¤erentiating (15) again totally around
the stationary point, (and using again that Cx (x (; ) ; ; ) = 0) we have
dx
d
=

 Vx (x (; ) ; ) + Cx (x (; ) ; ; ) + Cx (x (; ) ; ; ) @@ F ( j)f( j)


Vxx (x (; ) ; )  Cxx (x (; ) ; ; )  Cxx (x (; ) ; ; ) F ( j)f( j)
 :
By assumption we have Vx (x (; ) ; ) Cx (x (; ) ; ; )  0: Thus, to com-
plete the proof, we show that a¢ liation implies that @@
F ( j)
f( j)  0:
Recall that two random variables are a¢ liated if for   0 and   0
f (; ) f
 
0; 0
  f  0;  f (; 0) :
Dividing on both sides by g () g (0) ; where g () =
R 

f (; ) d and g (0) =R 

f (; 0) d are the marginal densities, we can write
f ( j ) f  0 j0   f  0 j  f ( j0 ) :
Integrating over 0 between  and  we nd
f ( j )F ( j0 )  F ( j ) f ( j0 ) :
Rearranging, we have
F ( j0 )
f ( j0 ) 
F ( j )
f ( j )
which is, if F (j )f(j ) is di¤erentiable in ; equivalent to
@
@

F (j )
f(j )

 0:
The intuition behind this result is straightforward. Recall that the indirect
utility of a type  j is given by u (; ) = R 

Cy (x (y; ) ; ; y) dy: The rent of
this type is determined by the production schedule o¤ered to all types who are
less e¢ cient than this type. So, type  j has no incentive to mimic a type of a
lower quality ^ <  if less able types produce smaller quantities. We can now
understand why this will indeed be the case provided that types are a¢ liated.
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The higher is  the higher is f(j )F (j ) ; so the greater is the weight given to the
principals e¢ ciency motive as opposed to the motive to limit the agents rents.
Put another way, it is relatively less likely that the agent is a low cost producer
when he produces a high level of quality. Therefore, the rent given to any given
type  j is higher the higher is ; and this type has no incentive to report a
lower value of his quality parameter :
3 Regulation
The regulation problem was rst studied by Baron and Myerson [1982] when the
rms costs are unknown to the regulator. Lewis and Sappington [1988] have
extended their analysis when in addition to cost, demand conditions - more
precisely the intercept of a linear demand function - are unobservable to the
regulator.5 We provide a variant on this two-dimensional screening problem
where the level of demand is a¤ected by a quality choice made by the rm
and the regulator can observe the quality choice but not the upper bound on
the quality the producer is able to provide. We show that this two-dimensional
screening problem can be solved using the same techniques as in the procurement
problem in Section 2.
Consumers valuations for a quantity x of a good whose quality is q are
described by the downward sloping inverse demand function P (x; q) : Dene
the gross consumer surplus of a consumer who buys x units of a good of quality
q at a constant marginal price as
V (x; q) 
xZ
0
P (z; q) dz:
As in Section 2, the good is produced by a rm with a cost of production of
C (x; q; ) for q   and innity otherwise.
The regulator maximizes a weighted sum of net consumer surplus and pro-
ducer surplus under incentive constraints. The regulators instruments are a
constant payment t; a marginal price p; and a choice of quality q. Under a
5See Armstrong [1999] for an analysis of some technical problems in Lewis and Sappington.
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truthful mechanism, the joint surplus for a given tuple (; ) is equal to
V

X
 
p (; ) ; q (; )
  p (; )X p (; ) ; q (; )  t (; )
+

t (; ) + p (; )X
 
p (; ) ; q (; )
  CX p (; ) ; q (; ); q (; ) ; 
where X (p; q) is the direct demand function for the good which, is assumed to
be downward sloping, Xp (p; q) < 0.
It is easy to see that Propositions 1, 2 and 3 apply to this model. The
idea is to hold the prot of the rm constant by compensating the rm ex-
actly for increases in costs due to an increase in the quality the rm pro-
duces. That means that the change in t (; ) due to a slight increase in q
is just equal to Cq (x (; ) ; q (; ) ; ) ; the increase in gross consumer surplus
is Vq (x (; ) ; q (; )) : Hence, under our assumptions it is optimal to produce
the highest quality, so q (; ) =  for all ; :
Proceeding the same way as in the procurement model, we solve the screen-
ing problems conditional on  and prove the incentive compatibility of these
problemssolutions using the solutions themselves. Let
 (; ) = max
^
n
t

^; 

+ p

^; 

X

p

^; 

; 

  C

X

p

^; 

; 

; ; 
o
:
where we use again the notation (; ) to indicate that we condition on :
Lemma 2 The price and payment schedules, p(; ) and t(; ), are imple-
mentable if and only if
 (; ) =
Z

Cz (X (p (z; ) ; ) ; ; z) dz (16)
and p (; ) is non-decreasing in :
Proof. The proof of (16) proceeds just as in the proof of Lemma 1. We now
show that the price schedule must be non-decreasing.
Incentive compatibility requires that type (; ) has no incentive to mimic
type

^; 

t (; ) + p (; )X (p (; ) ; )  C (X (p (; ) ; ) ; ; )
 t

^; 

+ p

^; 

X

p

^; 

; 

  C

X

p

^; 

; 

; ; 

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and that type

^; 

has no incentive to mimic type (; )
t

^; 

+ p

^; 

X

p

^; 

; 

  C

X

p

^; 

; 

; ; ^

 t (; ) + p (; )X (p (; ) ; )  C

X (p (; ) ; ) ; ; ^

:
Summing these inequalities gives
C

X

p

^; 

; 

; ; 

  C

X

p

^; 

; 

; ; ^

 C (X (p (; ) ; ) ; ; )  C

X (p (; ) ; ) ; ; ^

:
Writing as integrals, we have
Z
^
Cz

X

p

^; 

; 

; ; z

dz 
Z
^
Cz (X (p (; ) ; ) ; ; z) dz:
Given that Cx  0 this requires for  > ^ that X

p

^; 

; 

 X (p (; ) ; )
or p

^; 

 p (; ) : Hence, prices must be non-decreasing in :
Substituting  (; ) into the objective function, and integrating by parts,
we can write the regulators problem as
Z

h
V (X (p (; ) ; ) ; )  C (X (p (; ) ; ) ; ; )
i
f ( j ) d
 
Z

h
(1  )C (X (p (; ) ; ) ; ; ) F ( j )
f ( j )
i
f ( j ) d
subject to p (; ) being non-decreasing in .
Proposition 6 The optimum satises the rst-order condition
p (; )  Cx (X (p (; ) ; ) ; ; )  (1  )Cx (X (p (; ) ; ) ; ; ) F ( j )
f ( j )

Xp (p (; )) = 0:
Proof. Recalling that the cost function can be written as
C(c; q; ) = c(x; ) + k(x; q);
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the rst-order condition simplies to
p (; )  cx (X (p (; )) ; )  (1  ) cx (X (p (; )) ; ) F ( j )
f ( j ) = 0:
Di¤erentiating totally with respect to  and p we have
dp
d
=
 cx (X (p (; )) ; )  (1  ) cx (X (p (; )) ; ) F (j )f(j )   (1  ) cx (X (p (; )) ; ) @@ F (j )f(j )

 

1 

cxx (X (p (; )) ; ) + (1  ) cxx (X (p (; )) ; ) F (j )f(j )

Xp (p (; ))
 :
The denominator of this expression is negative by the second-order condition
of the regulators maximization problem. Using our assumption that cx  0,
cx  0; and @@ F (j )f(j )  0; we observe that dpd  0 as required for incentive
compatibility.
Next, we show that the solution remains incentive compatible when  is no
longer observable.
Proposition 7 Given the regularity conditions of Propositions 4 and 5, the
unobservability of  does not a¤ect the solution to the principals problem.
Proof. Again, we identify the schedules p (; )  p (; ) and  (; )   (; )
for all : Using the additive separability of the cost function and di¤erentiating
the prot of the rm with respect to  we have
 (; ) =
Z


czx (X (p (z; )) ; z)Xp (p (z; ))
dp (z; )
d

dz:
A su¢ cient condition for incentive compatibility is dp(z;)d  0. Di¤erentiating
the rst-order condition totally with respect to  and p we have
dp
d
=

  (1  ) cx (X (p (; )) ; ) @@ F (j )f(j )

 

1 

cxx (X (p (; )) ; ) + (1  ) cxx (X (p (; )) ; ) F (j )f(j )

Xp (p (; ))
 :
Since the denominator is negative, dp(z;)d  0 if @@ F (j )f(j )  0: This is exactly
what a¢ liation implies.
Thus, we have shown that all the results of Section 2 apply to the regulation
application as well as to the procurement problem discussed there.
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4 Selling to a budget constrained buyer
Che and Gale (2000) investigate the problem of selling to a buyer who has
private information about his valuation of a good and about how much he can
spend on the good. In other words, the buyer faces a budget constraint and
the sellers choice of selling procedure may be constrained by the fact that the
buyer cannot spend more than he has. Che and Gale distinguish between the
case where the seller is able to demand that the buyer place a bond and the case
where the seller is not able to do so. If the seller can demand the placement
of such a bond, then, the buyer is e¤ectively only able to mimic types with
a lower budget, but not types with a higher budget, because in that case the
buyer would be unable to pay. We treat the case where the seller can require the
buyer to place a bond because it is readily amenable to the approach proposed
in Section 2.
A buyers type is a tuple ;  (v; w in Che and Gales notation) where  is
the valuation of a buyer for a good o¤ered by the seller and  is the buyers
spending limit. The seller has one unit of a good on sale. We let x (; ) denote
the probability of delivery of the good to the buyer of type (; ) : Equivalently,
we may think of x (; ) as the fraction of the good delivered to the buyer, in
case the good is actually divisible. We let t (; ) denote the payment made
by the buyer with type (; ) : The budget constraint of the buyer has the fol-
lowing implications. First, any equilibrium payment must satisfy the feasibility
constraint
t (; )  :
Second, the budget constraint limits the buyers ability to mimic other types.
Given the feasibility constraint, and the placement of the bond that rules out
exaggerating the budget ; the incentive constraint of a type (; ) takes the
form that for all (; )
x (; )  t (; )  x

^; ^

  t

^; ^

for all ^; ^  : (17)
Finally, all types must be willing to particpate, that is
x (; )  t (; )  0:6 (18)
6The actual utility of the agent is +x (; ) t (; ) so that the participation constraint is
written as +x (; ) t (; )   and similarly for the incentive constraints (17). Because of
the additivity in , solving the problem in the net utility from participation, x (; ) t (; ),
is su¢ cient.
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The seller maximizes
Z

Z

t (; ) f (; ) dd
subject to constraints (17) and (18).
We solve this problem as before. We begin with the problem where the seller
knows  and conditions the contracts on : Then, we show that no buyer has
an incentive to mimic any type with a lower budget.
If the seller knows that the buyer has a budget of ; then she solves the
following problem:
max
x(;);t(;)
Z

(t (; )) f (j ) d
such that for all 
x (; )  t (; )  x

^; 

  t

^; 

for all ^;
x (; )  t (; )  0; and
t (; )  :
Letting the net indirect utility gain of type (; ) be
u (; ) = max
^

^; 

  t

^; 

we know from the argument in Section 2 that it can be written as
u (; ) = u (; ) +
Z

x (z; ) dz:
Clearly it is optimal to extract all the rents from the type with the lowest
valuation, so u (; ) = 0: Using the fact that
u (; ) = x (; )  t (; )
we can substitute
t (; ) = x (; ) 
Z

x (z; ) dz (19)
into the sellers objective function. After an integration by parts, it can be
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written
max
x(;)
Z


   1  F (j )
f (j )

x (; ) f (j ) d
subject to
x (; ) non-decreasing in ; and
x (; ) 
Z

x (z; ) dz  :
Given the following assumptions on the joint distribution of characteristics,
our pointwise procedure applies: assume that for each  the distribution of 
conditional on  satises
@
@
1  F (j )
f (j )  0 (20)
and that the random variables (; ) are a¢ liated, implying that
@
@
1  F (j )
f (j )  0: (21)
Let  () solve the equation
 () =
1  F ( ()j )
f ( ()j ) : (22)
By (20), there is at most one such value. Assuming, in addition, that   1f( j) ;
implies there is exactly one value  (). The objective is increasing in x (; )
for  <  (), and decreasing in x (; ) for  >  () : The solution depends
on whether  ()   or  () > :
In the former case, when  ()  ; the budget constraint of the buyer is
slack when the seller implements the optimal selling mechanism. To see this,
suppose that the the budget constraint is indeed slack. Then, the solution
involves x (; ) = 0 for  <  () and x (; ) = 1 for    () : The
payment then takes the form of
t (; ) =
(
0 for  <  ()
 () for    () :
Clearly, this payment schedule satises the budget constraint for all buyers only
if  ()  :
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Suppose, on the other hand, that  () > : Then, the budget constraint
must be binding for some types and the presence of the term
R 

x (z; ) dz in the
budget constraint forces us to use control techniques. Let y (; )  R 

x (z; ) dz
and consider the optimal control problem with
H (; ) =

   1  F (j )
f (j )

f (j )x (; )
subject to
y (; ) = x (; )
and
x (; )  y (; )  :
The Lagrangian for this problem is
L =

   1  F (j )
f (j )

x (; ) f (j )+ ()x (; )+ () (   x (; ) + y (; )) :
From the maximum principle, the optimal value of the control variable, x (; ) ;
satises
x (; ) = arg max
x(;)

   1  F (j )
f (j )

f (j ) +  ()   () 

x (; ) ;
 ()  0;    x (; ) + y (; )  0, and
 () (   x (; ) + y (; )) = 0:
Moreover, the optimal path of the costate variable,  () ; satises the conditions
 () =   @L
@y (; )
=   () ;
and

 


= 0
where the latter condition is a transversality condition we impose on our problem
with given initial value y (; ) = 0 and free endpoint y
 
; 

:
The solution to this problem is of the form that x (; ) = 0 for  <  ()
and x (; ) = x () for    () where x () solves
 ()x () = :
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The associated payment schedule is t (; ) = 0 for  <  () and t (; ) = 
for    () :
To see this, note rst that for  <  () ; L is decreasing in x (; ) because
the term

   1 F ( j)f( j)

x (; ) f (j ) is decreasing in x (; ) : Hence the seller
does not want to sell to these types, which implies that  () = 0 for  <
 () : Since the state variable y (; ) enters the problem exclusively through
the binding budget constraint, the sellers objective function for  <  () is
independent of the value of y (; ) so that  () = 0 for  <  () :
For    () ; the term

   1 F ( j)f( j)

x (; ) f (j ) is increasing in
x (; ) : Hence, if the budget constraint of the buyer is non-binding, then the
seller would like to set x (; ) = 1 for    () : For the sake of the argument,
suppose the seller already sets x (; ) = 1 for  =  () : But then the payment
made by type  () would have to satisfy  ()   y ( () ; )  : But since
y ( () ; ) = 0 and  () > ; this condition is violated.
Finally, it remains to be shown that the budget constraint must be binding
for all types larger than  () : The reason is that incentive compatibility implies
that the payment is non-decreasing in : Di¤erentiating (19) with respect to 
we obtain
t (; ) = x (; ) + x (; )  x (; ) = x (; )  0
In fact the binding budget constraint directly implies that x (; ) = 0; if the
budget constraint is binding over an interval then the change of expenditure,
t (; ) ; must equal the change of the budget, 0; over that interval. Hence,
x (; ) = 0 over the entire interval

 () ; 

: Hence x (; ) is equal to a
constant, x () for all  2  () ;  :
Next we show that the solution satises incentive compatibility in the 
dimension. To accomplish this, we have to show that x (; ) is non-decreasing
in :
First, we show that the value of  () is non-increasing in . Totally di¤er-
entiating (22) yields
1  @
@
1  F ( ()j )
f ( ()j )

d =
@
@
1  F ( ()j )
f ( ()j ) d
so that
d
d
=
@
@
1 F ( ()j)
f( ()j)
1  @@ 1 F ( 
()j)
f( ()j)
 :
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Note that (20) and (21) imply that d

d  0.
Second, we show that x () = () is increasing in : Di¤erentiating with
respect to  we obtain
x () =
 ()   () 
( ())2
> 0:
In other words, higher  consumers consume higher amounts of the good, and
are therefore less constrained than lower  consumers.
Finally, we take these two results together to show that the net indirect
utility gain of type (; ) is higher than the net indirect utility gain of type
(; ^) for ^ < : Recall that
u (; ) =
Z

x (z; ) dz:
Steps one and two have established that x (; )  x (; ^) for ^ < ; where
the inequality is strict for some  if consumers with budget ^ are constrained.
It follows that u (; )  u (; ^) for ^ < : Thus, we have shown the following:
Proposition 8 Suppose that @@
1 F ( j)
f( j)  0 and that ( ; ) are a¢ liated and
dene  () as the unique solution to
 () =
1  F ( ()j )
f ( ()j ) :
Then, the optimal selling procedure when both  and  are the buyers private
information is
x (; ) =
(
0 for  <  ()
x () = min
n

() ; 1
o
for    ()
with an associated payment schedule
t (; ) =
(
0 for  <  ()
 ()x () for    ()
The intuition is quite simple. If the seller can force the buyer to place a
bond, then exaggerating ones budget is not a feasible deviation for the buyers
and only downward deviations have to be ruled out. The pointwise optimal
policy (that is, the optimal policy for each ) is a take-it-or-leave-it o¤er at a
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price  () : So, it must not be the case that the buyer can obtain a better price
by claiming his budget was lower. Hence,  () must be non-increasing in :
Setting a policy with that property is indeed optimal if the standard monopoly
trade-o¤between raising revenue per unit sold and decreasing units sold changes
the right way as  is increased. When (; ) are a¢ liated then the conditional
distribution of  given  has more and more mass towards the lower realizations
of  when  is increased. Hence it becomes optimal to lower the price when 
increases. Since low budget types cannot mimic high budget types, the sellers
policy of selling is in fact also incentive compatible.
5 Concluding Remarks
For screening problems with two unknown characteristics we have demonstrated
a procedure that makes a particular subset of these problems readily solvable.
The restrictions are twofold. One of the characteristics can only be mimicked in
one direction and the bound on this characteristic must be part of the optimum.
Secondly, the two characteristics must satisfy an a¢ liation property which can
vary from problem to problem.
We demonstrate the e¤ectiveness of this procedure in solving in some detail
a procurement model where quantity and quality of a commodity are unknown
but where agents can only mimic agent only capable of producing a lower qual-
ity. In addition, the upper bound on each agents quality must be desired at
the optimum. The procedure lets us rst solve the one-dimensional screening
problems conditional on the quality variable and then demonstrates that no
one wishes to mimic a lower quality so that the solutions to the all of the one-
dimenional problems are in fact the solutions to the overall problem. We then
show briey that a standard regulation problem and a problem proposed by Che
and Gale [2000] where the seller faces possibly budget-constrained buys can be
solved using this procedure.
Our approach extends to any problem that exhibits the two features we
mentioned above, and indeed the logic of the argument goes beyond that.
Malakhov and Vohra [2005a,2005b] and Iyengar and Kumar [2006] have studied
auction problems where biddersvaluations and capacities for consumption are
unknown. They show that the solution to the problem when only valuations are
private information remains incentive compatible when the second dimension
of private information is added. Moreover, as ours does, their result extends
to any problem with similar features, that is, any problem where the principal
has two choice variables, and one of them - the quantity allocated to an agent
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- interacts non-trivially with the agents types. In contrast, our results apply
to problems where the principal has three choices to make and two of them -
the quantity and the quality allocated to the agent - interact non-trivially with
the agents types. Taken together, these results demonstrate the usefulness of
the model structures to obtain insights into the problem of multi-dimensional
screening.
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